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,4;/ost students of human nature and society agree that the common-
sense knowledge we have of our lives consists largely of misunder-
standing. In part, this occurs because of simple ignorance. As C. Wright
Mills argued, people have direct awareness only of the private orbits
in which their daily lives revolve, and lack the sociological imagination
required to grasp the &dquo;intricate connection between the patterns of their
own lives and the course of world history.&dquo; But beyond ignorance we
confront deception. Psychoanalysis, for example, teaches that we have
but a surface knowledge of our own motives, and that we intentionally
limit this knowledge for fear of discovering what lies below. The ex-
ternal world also eludes us. There, history teaches that political power
endeavors to conceal its nature behind ideological smokescreens-
and, as we saw again in the Vietnam era, behind outright lies.
The success of social science can be measured by the extent to which
it expands the boundaries between our private orbits of direct experi-
ence and the social and psychological structures that shape them from
a distance. And perhaps more importantly, social science can be judged
by the extent to which it brings to light relationships between social
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Figure f: Incnpsy-.:hic and S<>cial Influences on 8t:hJvior
and psychological structures. We can diagram this task by drawing a
continuum of causal factors, stretching outside of the person to the
right and inside to the left (see Figure I). To the right, causal influence
runs through the immediate situations or milieux of family, frier.ds.
work, and leisure; to the organizations and institutions in which these
are embedded; and finally to the political, economic, and technological
structures of society as a whole. On the left, this continuum reaches
through the person’s conscious thoughts and feelings to ways of seeing,
feeling, and conceptua!izing that are simply taken for granted (such as
language. traits, and cognitive schema) and finally to the psychological
structures of wishes, defenses, and infantile logic that remain un-
conscious.’
Some relationships beg to be noticed: international events hit home
clearly at the gasoline pump; anxiety affects work performance. Others
are less apparent, but easily discovered: that &dquo;Type A&dquo; personalities
have more heart disease; that welfare policies encourage the breakup
of poor families. Still others are difficult to ferret out and difficult to
accept: that Oedipal hostilities lie beneath a conflict with one’s super-
visor: and that the character of work. determined by centuries of
industrialization, private enterprise, and unionization, has equal
responsibility for such a conflict. How well do the social sciences
measure up to the ideal of enlightening us about the more remote
influences on our daily lives?
According to the traditional view of science as a set of methods that
guarantee a privileged access to Truth, the question should not even
be posed in this fashion. All one need do is assess how well researchers
adhere to the canons of scientific proof. Those who view the social
sciences from this perspective praise its historical emancipation from
philosophy and politics, and urge that this emulation of the natural
sciences finally be consummated. They attribute the shortcomings
of the social sciences either to remaining elements of metaphysical
contamination or to the fact that they are &dquo;young&dquo; sciences still finding
their bearings.
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A more skeptical assessment comes from those who view science-
like other public institutions-as influenced by politics, power, money,
and ideology. In the late 1930s, for example, Robert S. Lynd (1940)
diagnosed the social sciences as suffering from a &dquo;centripital tendency&dquo;
to spiral away from one another into technical specialties studying
limited aspects of social phenomena. These specialties, he claimed,
focus on the administrative problems of various social institutions and
fail to examine the impact of those institutions on the lives of individuals
and on American culture as a whole. To correct this, he called for more
interdisciplinary training and cooperation, with &dquo;culture&dquo; as a unifying
concept. In the late 1950s, Gunnar Myrdal ( 1958) expressed his opti-
mism that the greater involvement of social scientists in policy-making
would counter the trend toward specialization. But he also warned of
the dangers of commercialization, which he feared might harness
researchers to the policies of business and government, muting critical
inquiry.
At the same time, C. Wright Mills (1959) argued that American
social science had become obsessed with detailed studies of isolated
milieux to the neglect of psychological and social structures. He further
observed that as social science became professionalized and began
&dquo;selling its wares&dquo; to industry and government, it produced more and
more &dquo;knowledge&dquo; tailored to the administrative problems of running
bureaucratic organizations and providing the underprivileged with
welfare and social services. With some skepticism about its real pros-
pects, Mills, too, called for more interdisciplinary cooperation. Jean
Piaget (1978) recently surveyed the field of psychology, also found
it lacking on this score, and made yet another plea:
With the present state of knowledge, it would, in fact, be regrettable
and visionless to leave such collaboration to chance encounters or
individual initiative. Interdisciplinary cooperation is necessary and
must be organized [Piaget, 1978: 652].
Jurgen Habermas (1970, 1973) steps beyond these criticisms to claim
that social science has become so intimately tied to the practical prob-
lems of bureaucratic control that it has embraced a scientistic and
technical style of thought. He contends that this apparent &dquo;rationality&dquo;
is actually highly ideological. in that it automatically leads to defining
social problems as technical issues in terms congenial to the interests
of those already in power. Taking a similar approach, Gouldner (1970)
undertook a historical analysis of major sociological paradigms. He
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concluded that the functionalism dominant in American sociology
contains at its very core ideological assumptions that reflect an adminis-
trative rationality congenial to the bureaucratic institutions that
organize so much of the modern social world. Three more specialized
lines of research converge in support of these general criticisms: history
of science, self-criticism, and knowledge utilization.
His/Dry of Science
Studies by historians of science such as Kuhn ( 197~, 1977), Lakatos
(1970), and Feyerabend ( 1975), and by sociologists of science such as
Merton ( 1973, 1977), Hagstrom ( 1975~, and Ben-David (1966, 1975)
show that even the natural sciences do not progress autonomously in
accordance with their own rigorous rules. These researchers have
demonstrated that many scientific controversies and achievements
cannot be explained without invoking &dquo;external&dquo; factors ranging from
generational conflict within the scientific community to the investment
of competing theories with symbolic significance in major political
struggles. In spite of a paucity of historical studies, a probable majority
of social scientists recognizes from personal experience that at least
three major types of &dquo;external&dquo; influence operate on their fields:
a. Funding. The investigation of social phenomena depends no
less on funding or science policy decisions than does research on sub-
atomic particles or cancer. Before World War lI, for example, the
field of &dquo;clinical psychology&dquo; consisted of administering and scoring .
mental tests, rather than conducting psychotherapy. The Veteran’s
Administration’s large-scale funding of traineeships (to provide dis-
turbed returning soldiers with the therapeutic manpower2 psychiatry
either lacked or withheld) virtually created clinical psychology as it
exists today, comprising roughly half the membership of the American
Psychological Association. The pervasive influence of funding patterns
spreads through direct research grants and the support of research
and educational institutions, in addition to financing professional
training programs. With federal funds increasing enormously since
1945,3 researchers and practitioners alike have followed the money with
an eagerness that led one prestigious psychologist to speak of them
as &dquo;profiteers.&dquo;4 Like the American Medical Association, the American
Psychological Association and other social science associations actively
engage in congressional lobbying (such as for a National Health In-
surance Plan that includes provisions for payment to non-M.D. psy-
chologists for therapeutic treatment).
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(b) Professionalization. The state of the academic job market and
the rules of &dquo;publish or perish&dquo; exert a widespread influence on the
complexity of research undertaken, and the development of new
research fields. Similarly, the growth of industry and government
markets for knowledge and skills has led to the creation of research
programs outside of academia, to professional careers devoted to
the solution of administrative problems and the delivery of social
services, and to substantial consulting ties with academia. All of these
developments focus research attention on a range of problems pre-
dominantly relevant to the sponsor. In the area of consumer decision-
making, for example, the vast quantity of marketing and advertising
research dwarfs that which might help to reduce needless consumption.
(c) Public issues. While the debate continues about whether social
psychology should be science or history (Gergen, 1973), it is clear that
much of it is history, and even more of it is inspired by contemporary
events. The Authoritarian Personality study, Milgram’s obedience
experiments, the intelligence and heredity debate, and the growth of
research on helping behavior after the Kitty Genovese murder are a
few examples of research that arose in response to social events and
made a significant impact on &dquo;basic&dquo; research in a number of dis-
ciplines.
Self-Criticism
Some social scientists have criticized their own fields for biased
definitions and research interests, and also for a general acceptance of
established institutional arrangements. Liazos (1972), for example,
took the sociology of deviance to task for concentrating on &dquo;nuts, sluts
and perverts&dquo; to the neglect of white-collar crime, lying by public
officials, and the kind of covert institutional violence that allows land-
lords to leave lead paint peeling off the walls of tenement housing.
Ryan (1976) described how a major pharmaceutical concern put out
posters warning &dquo;Lead Paint Can Kill!&dquo; and a large urban health
department put out a coloring book warning poor parents and their
children to keep away from it. Meanwhile, laws that would send land-
lords to jail for allowing lead paint to be exposed in rental units go
unenforced.
Bisno (1956) and Cloward and Piven (1977) attacked social work’s
focus on the personality and family factors in their clients’ difficulties.
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Gusfield ( 1975) documented the nearly exclusive concern with driver
characteristics as the causes of auto accidents-to the neglect of ve-
hicle and highway design. In the field of industrial psychology, Baritz
( I 960) alleged that researchers have put themselves in the service of
management, ignoring labor’s concerns. More recently, Nord ( 197?)
charged that studies of job satisfaction have explored &dquo;an incomplete
and biased set of dependent variabies,&dquo; usually those of interest to
management, such as productivity and absenteeism. We would have
a very different sort of knowledge. he says, if researchers had been
studying self-actualization, organizational democracy, equity, and
justice.
In a historical account of suicidology, Light ( 1973) showed how
psychiatry essentially took ownership of the field, defining suicide as
a psychiatric problem needing psychiatric intervention. Judging from
data on suicide rates, however, this professional appropriation of the
problem has had little impact. Finally, Sampson (1977) argued that
American psychology in general reflects American culture’s &dquo;self-
contained individualism&dquo; by treating both desirable and undesirable
characteristics as if they are located entirely within persons, rather than
within collectivities.
Another set of recent critiques comes from persons angered by the
way social scientists have studied them. Morin (1977), for example,
examined 139 studies of homosexuality listed in Pscyological Ab-
stracts between 1967 and 1974 and found a pervasive antihomosexual
bias of two sorts. First, homosexuality was studied largely in terms of .
diagnosis, causes, and cures-thereby defining it as a pathological
state. Second, these articles failed to study the issues gay people most
want to learn about: the consequences of self-disclosure, the dynamics
of gay relationships, and the development of positive identities. Protests
bv gay organizations have led to official redefinitions of homosexuality
by the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psycho-
logical Association.
On virtually every issue involving gender, women have challenged
the way they have been studied and are pioneering new ways of examin-
ing sex roles, socialization, adult development, marriage, family
relations, and career achievement. Ehrenreich and English’s For Her
Own Good (1978) brings together a number of forceful criticisms of
experts’ advice to women. But in no area has the antipathy of women
toward researchers run deeper than with regard to rape. Research on
rape traditionally has been split between the pathology of the offender
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and the pathology of the victim and, as Albin ( 1977) documents. the
first of these projects usually led back to another woman-wife or
mother-as cause of the male’s crime. The second, running from
Freud through Amir (1971}, produced a considerable literature on the
woman’s role in &dquo;precipitating&dquo; rapes. Meanwhile, cultural values
supporting male aggressiveness and the impact of rapes on victims
received scant attention. Brownmiller (1975), Davis (1978}, Hilberman
(1977), Wood (1975), Largen (1976), and others have condemned this
victim-blaming and undertaken needed studies on victims. Albin
(1977) summarizes the position taken in many of these critiques when
she writes that psychology’s victim-blaming
was the inevitable outcome of a derogatory societal view of women.
of a psychology dominated by men who shared and promulgated this
view, and of research designs that reflected this male culture and male
psychology. The culture thus spawned a science that affirmed and then
exaggerated it [.4lbin, 1977: 429].
Mills’ examination of social pathology textbooks (1943) pioneer ed
the empirical study of these issues. He found social problems treated
as if they were separate, practical problems occurring in isolated situa-
tions and analyzed largely in terms of a &dquo;paste-pot eclectic psychology.&dquo;
More recently. Caplan and Nelson ( 1973} examined the research buy
psychologists indexed under &dquo;Negro&dquo; in Psychological Abstracts for
the first six months of 1970. Coding abstracts for the type of relation-
ships investigated between personal characteristics, situational charac-
teristics, and problem characteristics, they found 82% falling into
categories &dquo;that lend themselves, directly or by implication, to inter-
preting the difficulties of Black Americans in terms of personal short-
comings.&dquo; Since the topic under study-Negroes-reflects a concrete
social problem rather than a general psychological process, this pre-
occupation with personal characteristics has important political and
social policy implications. For one thing, it defines the problem in terms
of personal pathologies and ignores the role of prior political and
technological failures. It further justifies person-change rather than
system-change treatment programs, and reinforces the power of those
who administer individually focused therapy and social welfare pro-
grams. Finally, Caplan and Nelson point out that &dquo;person-blame
interpretations are in everyone’s interests except those subjected to
analysis,&dquo; which perhaps accounts for why researchers who are also
victims have been criticizing social science with increasing vehemence.
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Knowledge Utilization
Research on knowledge utilization has produced-in addition to a
host of schemes for more efficient packaging and dissemination of
research findings-a number of serious questions about the assumption
that use is always advisable. Critiques of &dquo;psychotechnology&dquo;-the use
of drugs, psychosurgery, and conditioning techniques-have become
more frequent over the last decade, as have articles questioning the
politics of traditional psychotherapy (Robinson, 1973, Chorover,
1973; Halleck, 1971; Szasz, 1961, 1976; Beit-Hallahmi, 1974). U.S.
Appeals Court Judge David Bazelon ( 1974) put the issue directly to the
American Psychiatric Association:
Will the new found techniques be used exclusively as palliatives for
problems with social antecedents? Will we focus on &dquo;psychocivilizing&dquo;
the individual? Or will we confront the gross societal conditions which
foster such human misery and disability? ,
Another example concerns the attempt to devise and compile indices
to monitor the nation’s social well-being. In the face of widespread
enthusiasm for promoting the use of such apparently objective &dquo;social
indicators&dquo; by policy makers, Campbell (1975) proposed the &dquo;pes-
simistic law&dquo; that &dquo;the more any quantitative social indicator is used for
social decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pres-
sures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social process
it is intended to monitor&dquo; (p. 35). As an example, he points to the impact
of programs evaluating police departments in some jurisdictions by
their &dquo;clearance rate,&dquo; the proportion of crimes solved to crimes
reported. In order to meet pressure by public officials to produce high
clearance rates, police have responded by failing to record all citizen
complaints, postponing the recording of crimes until they have been
solved, and plea-bargaining (convincing criminals caught for a serious
crime to confess to several lesser unsolved ones in exchange for reduced
punishment).
Campbell cites further examples from a variety of fields, including
the emphasis on &dquo;body counts&dquo; in Vietnam that provided an incentive
and rationale for Lieutenant Calley’s actions at My Lai. &dquo;His goals had
been corrupted by the worship of a quantitative indicator,&dquo; Campbell
says. &dquo;leading both to a reduction in the validity of that indicator... and
a corruption of the social processes it was designed to reflect&dquo; (p. 38).
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This body-count mentality helped legitimate the license to kill indis-
criminately.
Caplan and Nelson (1973) question the widespread and unques-
tioned assumption that social policy based on research findings will
necessarily be better than that based on values or principles. They
point out that the production of knowledge is not objective and value-
free, but that it occurs and within an institutional framework that
favors research on personal factors and discourages research on social
factors:
When authorities offer person-blame explanations for particular social
problems and make research funds available, suddenly one’s disciplinary
outlook, career gains, and socially acceptable behavior all converge for
the psychologist. By investigating a social problem in terms given him. a
mutually beneficial exchange relarionship is established: the researcher
is rewarded both materially and in terms of prestige (in addition to
remaining a &dquo;proper member of the group&dquo;) by using the tools of his
trade; while on the other side of the exchange, officialdom stands to have
its preferred interpretation buttressed by the respectability of &dquo;scientific
data&dquo; [Caplan and Nelson, 1973: 206].
Ryan ( I9?b) made similar points in describing the subtle process by
which reform-minded social scientists end up blaming victims for social
problems.
MFTHOD
In order to explore more fully the provocative findings of Caplan and
Nelson, we have conducted a larger investigation of the way social
science studies social problems. Taking samples of the literature from
the years 1936, 1956, and 1976, we read and coded a total of 698 articles
in six social problem areas: alcohol and drug abuse, suicide, delin-
quency. job satisfaction, rape, and race relations. These articles came
from both pure and applied journals that included medical, psychiatric,
psychological, sociological, social work, management and industrial
relations, anthropology, criminology. law, education, and special-
problem journals on topics such as suicidology, race, and alcoholism.5
We read every article thoroughly and coded over 80 pieces of infor-
mation for each. The coding system is too elaborate to present here.
except for the variables that will be discussed below: type of journal,
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type of article (theoretical, research, program evaluation or report,
literature review), independent variables, causal attributions, relevance
to theory or practice, and type of theory or practice under consideration.
To profile each article along the continuum of causal factors men-
tioned earlier, we coded the independent variables6 (measured in
empirical articles or discussed in theoretical ones) into 17 categories
ranging from personal characteristics to system characteristics, as
shown in Figure 2. The distribution of these variables represents one
way of assessing how the problem under investigation is being defined
(that is, as a problem of person, milieu, or system factors). This does not
reflect the author’s final position on the matter, but what goes into the
article in terms of variables to be measured or brought up for considera-
tion.
Another way of assessing problem definition is to examine the
causal attributions made by authors after they have reported negative
findings; summarized positive results; and have had a chance to link the
research to other studies, to variables at different levels of analysis, or to
larger theoretical systems. The following categories were used to code
the variables or chain of variables asserted to be related (either causally











delinquents have low IQs
delinquents come from broken homes
delinquents come from the lower .
socioeconomic strata.
broken homes cause low self-esteem,
which in turn leads to delinquency
poverty breeds low self-esteem,
which in turn leads to delinquency
poverty produces broken homes,
which in turn leads to delinquency
poverty produces broken homes,
which in turn leads to low self-esteem,
which in turn leads to delinquency
delinquent children cause marital
conflict between their parents
A third way of profiling each article derives from the fact that we
coded up to three causal attributions and could characterize each piece
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Flgur~ 2: 1’ariahlcs Studied
by the pattern ojattributions’ the authors report. For example, a study
of drug abuse might conclude that both oral dependence (a personal
characteristic) and drug-oriented peers (a milieu characteristic) lead to
addiction. This pattern ofaiiribuiioni would thus involve both person
problem and milieu problem attributions.
Results
The data presented here come from preliminary analyses of the most
important article characteristics. We are currently beginning a more
complex analysis, the results of which will be reported later in more
detail.
The major finding is that, taken together, the investigation of these
social problems has focused primarily on personal characteristics.
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of the 3,354 itidepet7deni variables
coded for the total sample. Table 1 shows the percentage of articles that
include a causal attribution of each type w~e coded. This suggests not
only an emphasis on person ’ problem relationships, but on the investi-
gation of &dquo;simple&dquo; relationships between two variables rather than of
’&dquo;complex&dquo; relations involving more than two levels of analysis. Of the
atrriburional partems that characterize each article. 58% involve onl~
simple relationships at a single leael (person, milieu, or system). ’8<j
involve simple relationships at different levels. 9( involve a single
complex relationship, and 7c7c involve multiple complex relationships or
a combination of simple and complex relationships
Table 2 presents the percentage of articles asserting each major
aitri:buil’onal’pattern. V1f’e see from this that 40~7c of the articles contain at
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Figure 3: Distribution ut Variahles Studied-Entire Sample ‘ = 698
least one attibution involving a system-level variable. Thirty-four
percent involve a milieu-level attribution and 75% involve a person-level
attribution. Thus, the literature does not completely ignore system
factors-a point we will return to below-but they certainly do not
receive the attention given to personal characteristics.
There is little evidence of change from 1936 to 1976 in the level of
independent variables investigated or in the attributions asserted. The
percentage of person and system variables studied remained constant-
about 60% person and 20% system. Milieu variables increased from 1 1 ~%
in )936 to !9% in t956, and then decreased to 15~’o in 1976. There was a
corresponding change in the percentage of articles making milieu,/
problem attributions (and milieu/ person/problem attributions) from
t9~&dquo;’r in 1936 to 35% in 1956, decreasing to 27% in 1976.
The percentage of articles making person/problem attributions
drops from 65% in 1936 to 63% in 1956 and 55% in 1976. The percentage
making only person; problem attributions decreases from 45% to 42%
and to 39% over that period. The percentage including some system-
level attribution did not show a corresponding increase, however,
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Figure 4: Total Sample
declining from 40% in 1936 to 33% in 1956 and 35% in 1976. More
detailed analysis of the data will be needed to flesh out this pattern.
When examined by problem area, the data reveal striking differences.
Table 3 shows, for each area, the percentage of articles falling into the
various attributional patterns. Figures 5A-5F profile the percentage of
person, milieu, and system independent variables studied in each area.9
Substance abuse and suicide show the strongest person-centered
orientation. Delinquency and job satisfaction also have large person-
centered orientations, with the delinquency literature showing some
interest in milieu and system variables (mostly family, peer group,
neighborhood, and school system). Job satisfaction shows considerably
more interest in milieu factors-mostly working conditions-and some
concern with the system factor of organizational structure. In addition
to a large focus on personal characteristics, the rape literature also
contains twice as much investigation of system factors--especially
cultural and sociopolitical-than any of the other four so far described.
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TABLE I
Causal Attributions in the Literature Surveyed




:attributional Patterns in the Literature Surveyed
NOTE: These figures are based on an N of 6 zrtictes..articles coded &dquo;Other&dquo; with h
respect :o causal attribution have been excluded- See Note 6 for a description of the
atrriburjonal pattern ’/ari.1ble.
Race relations stands by itself in its system-orientation, with every
system variable receiving more attention than in any other area.
Articles which might be characterized as &dquo;theoretical&dquo;-conceptual
discussions and literature reviews-differ in emphasis from empirical
work-research articles and reports or evaluations of programs. The
theoretical pieces discuss more system and fewer person variables than
do empirical articles, with b2% of the program report or evaluation































































































figure 5,.X: Substance .ibu*
the prevalence of person-change treatment strategies). This compares with
38% of the research articles, 27% of the conceptual pieces, and 19% of
the literature reviews with person attributions only. These article-type
differences do not appear to account for the system-orientation of the
race relations area, however, since this area has the highest ratio of
empirical studies to theoretical pieces (7 to 3) of any area except job
satisfaction (8 to 2).
There are also significant differences among journals, with consider-
ably more system focus in articles from sociology journals than in those
from psychology journals. Articles from medical and psychiatric
journals have the strongest person orientation. Material on race rela-
tions does come more frequently from sociology journals (74%) than that
on delinquency (49%), job satisfaction (37%), rape (30%), suicide (6%),
or substance abuse (4%).
Articles that made explicit links to theoretical issues did not differ
in their person-versus-system orientation from those making links to
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Figure SB: Suicidc
practical matters. We coded three levels of theory that articles might
claim relevance to: paradigm-like Grand Theory (psychoanalysis,
cognitive theory, behaviorism, Parsonian functionalism, Marxism,
structuralism), specific but well-articulated Middle Range Theory
(such as Herzberg’s two-factor theory of job satisfaction, Durkheim’s
theory of anomie and suicide), and Nontheoretical Hypotheses (single
hypotheses, such as that interracial contact decreases prejudice or that
delinquency is related to low intelligence).
Of those articles asserting relevance to theory, only 22% involved
Grand Theory and 82% of these referred to psychoanalysis. Fourteen
percent referred to Middle Range theories, and 70% to Nontheoretical
Hypothesis.10 The literature on these social problems thus appears
remarkably atheoretical and, with the exception of psychoanalysis,
lacks connections with theories that attempt to conceptualize either




Our sampling of journal articles gives a different view of the history
of these fields than would be found in a review article, a research pro-
posal, or a term paper. The latter view history as it is made by kings
and queens or great ideas. Our sample includes the conditions of the
masses-the 98% of the literature that otherwise would be ignored. The
portrait that emerges is far from exciting, pathbreaking, or heroic.
Social science ought to be the most comprehensive and integrative when
it deals with social problems, where its results can have profound &dquo;real
world&dquo; effects. Instead, it consists largely of the investigation of simple,
atheoretical hypotheses at single levels of analysis. In addition, the
concentration of inquiry at the personal characteristic end of the con-
tinuum does not just create a benign imbalance; it mystifies the whole
social world, concealing larger social institutions behind intrapsychic
obfuscations.
The literature on substance abuse, suicide, delinquency, and, to some
extent, rape focuses primarily on personal characteristics and in this
regard appears to have changed little since 1936. As we read articles in
these areas, we noticed a shift in language from morality to psychiatry
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Figure 5D: Joh Satisfaction
’ 
and from punishment to rehabilitation. This certainly should be viewed
as real progress, but it is doubtful how enthusiastically such progress
would be praised by the adolescent girl who was not sent to a reforma-
tory as punishment for her &dquo;immorality&dquo; (like her grandmother may
have been), but to a residential treatment center to receive therapy for
her sexual &dquo;acting-out&dquo; and &dquo;inability to delay gratification.&dquo; Further-
more, this linguistic progress is not matched by greater interest in the
causal role of system-level factors.
Research on job satisfaction has moved from person to milieu
variables, mainly between 1956 and 1976. In many of the 1936 articles,
job satisfaction appears as a component of satisfactory adjustment to
work. This research seems to have rested on the assumption that
personality variables were the key to adjustment and on the hope that
trait assessment would enable managers to select employees with the
greatest potential to produce. The impact of milieu studies like those of
Mayo and Roethlisberger, combined with the failure of assessment
techniques to live up to their promise, shifted attention to working
conditions, supervision, and other milieu factors under management
control. Thus, we find job satisfaction research today approaching the
ideal often held up for social science in general: systematic investigation
of person!situation interactions.
Research on rape stands out because it contains relatively frequent
discussion of system factors. Few American researchers had interest in
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Figures 5E: Rape
rape in 1936, and we selected every article indexed between 1933 and
1939 in order to get even a modest sample of 11. We passed over at least
five times that many in foreign languages-many of them discussions or
follow-up studies of castration therapy’ -and several medical articles
on methods of determining a victim’s virginity. Our 1936 sample tended
to treat rape as one of many sex offenses and to take a cross-cultural
look at how sex norms and the definitions of sex crimes vary. In 1956,
this system perspective disappeared, only to return in 1976 with a
feminist critique of &dquo;victim-blaming&dquo; research and of the cultural values
that support the male’s prerogative as sexual aggressor.
The literature on race relations is even more striking in its system
orientation. To some extent, our choice of research on &dquo;race relations&dquo;
rather than on &dquo;Negroes&dquo; eliminated a body of research we know from
Caplan and Nelson’s study to be person-centered (including studies of
race and 10 and a voluminous literature on physiological differences
between races). But our sample did include articles indexed under
&dquo;race,&dquo; &dquo;prejudice,&dquo; &dquo;attitudes,&dquo; &dquo;ethnic identity,&dquo; &dquo;racial discrimina-
tion,&dquo; and the new heading &dquo;racism.&dquo;
Our reading of these articles gave us the sense that they were remarka-
bly different from the other five areas in their relatively competent
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Figure SF: Race Relations
investigation and integration of social-structural characteristics.
Sociology, anthropology, political science, and economics have devel-
oped sophisticated models and methods for investigating system-level
characteristics, but it is only in the race relations literature that we begin
to see them brought into play.
Though we found little difference in the level of variables and rela-
tionships investigated in race relations between 1936 and 1976, our
reading disclosed a change in terminology more marked than in any
other area. In 1976 we find research not on &dquo;Negroes,&dquo; but on &dquo;Blacks&dquo;;
less on &dquo;prejudice&dquo; and more on &dquo;white racism&dquo;; less on &dquo;discrimination&dquo;
and more on &dquo;institutional racism&dquo;; less on &dquo;integration&dquo; and more on
&dquo;Black militancy.&dquo; While research on delinquency, substance abuse, and
suicide was being redefined in the language of the psychiatric profession,
we find research on rape and race relations being redefined in the
language of feminism and the Black movement.
Thus, the two areas with the most balanced treatment of person,
milieu, and system factors-rape and race relations-are also areas in
which there are organized social movements and organized, politicized
constituency groups within the research community. 12 In this vein, we
recently noticed a colloquium announcement on the results of a delin-
quency program evaluation subtitled: &dquo;A field experiment with rotten
kids.&dquo; Humorous, perhaps, but inconceivable had the topic been rape
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or race relations. The fact that women and Blacks occupy offices
adjacent to white male researchers guarantees that they be studied with
at least a minimum of respect and sensitivity to the implications of data
and theory.
Another example of the power of the studied can be seen in the
response to The ,Authoritarian Personality. Here was an empirically
based assertion that a pathological personality syndrome lay behind the
prejudiced attitudes of white males. Rarely in the history of social
science has a piece of research-and its accompanying hypothesis-
been put to such relentless methodological scrutiny. And by the time
the original instruments had been psychometrically renovated, the field
had moved on to less-traveled paths. Similar hypotheses about &dquo;addic-
tive&dquo; personalities, &dquo;suicidal&dquo; personality syndromes, and &dquo;antisocial&dquo;
personality types have never been subjected to that kind of critique and,
judging from our samples, they still attract serious interest. Alcoholics,
delinquents, and people with suicidal tendencies (note the reification of
behavior patterns into personal identities) have no so’cial movements or
constituencies to protest the way others study them or to conduct
inquiries into their own problems.’3
This suggests that the social sciences are closely intertwined with
&dquo;extrascientific&dquo; factors and, further, that where those who suffer from
social problems have power to influence how they are studied, social
science is better off for it. But why is the research on delinquency,
substance abuse, and suicide so person-focused? The answer that will
quickly pop into many minds is that these are simply &dquo;psychological
issues,&dquo; while race relations is inherently a &dquo;sociological issue.&dquo; In
addition to begging the question, the obviousness of this answer only
reflects the extent to which we accept the prevailing definitions of these
problems. To take an analogy from sports, imagine a foreigner watching
American football for the first time and asking, &dquo;Why are there three
men in the backtield’’&dquo; W’e would answer by explaining the rules and
strategies that make football the game it is. If he asked, &dquo;Why does Terry
Bradshaw play in the backfield rather than Joe Greene’?&dquo; however, we
would answer in terms of the physical and personal characteristics
of the two athletes.
Much of the research we examined on race relations seeks to answer
the first type of system-focused question: &dquo;Why is there so much racism
in our society?&dquo; The literature on delinquency, substance abuse, and
suicide, however, appears to endorse psychology’s scientific goal of
prediction and control and seeks to answer the second type of person-
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focused question: &dquo;Why is person X rather than person Y at risk?&dquo; As
one delinquency researcher told us, &dquo;We don’t blame poverty for
delinquency as much as we used to, because we recognize that the vast
majority of people reared in poverty don’t turn to delinquency and
crime.&dquo; If research begins with an acceptance of the stress, strains, and
hazards of our social institutions and then asks the second type of
question-&dquo; Who succumbs?&dquo;-the only possible answers are in terms of
individual differences, precisely the subject matter of psychological
science. Yet, there are no inherent reasons why we could not study race
relations from such a person-centered perspective: Given segregation,
who becomes prejudiced? Given rural poverty, who migrates north?
Given the Klan, who registers to vote anyway?
In any social problem area-including delinquency, substance abuse,
and suicide-the methods of scientific inquiry can be used to answer
either type of question. Job satisfaction provides a concrete example in
its shift from &dquo;Who adjusts?&dquo; to &dquo;What working conditions promote
satisfaction?&dquo; There is no scientirl(- reason why there could not be a
. further shift to system-level questions such as: &dquo;How much do employee
ownership and democratic control influence personal development?&dquo;
We also currently see rape research shifting from &dquo;Who acts out violence
against women?&dquo; and &dquo;Who precipitate attacks on themselves?&dquo; to
&dquo;What cultural patterns support male aggressiveness?&dquo; The reasons that
some questions are asked and others are not lie outside of the conduct of
inquiry in the real world of politics and power.
We are currently exploring the role of politics by tracing the impact
of external factors in the development of each area as a &dquo;social prob-
lem.&dquo; We are also conducting interviews with leading researchers and
practitioners in each area to ascertain their views on the past, present,
and likely future of their field. Both lines of inquiry point to the process
of professionalization’° as the key to the ideological shaping of science.
In the scientists’ own milieux. the academic reward system clears
paths of least resistance to simplistic studies of narrowly defined ques-
tions-the kind of research with rapid publication payoffs. Locked into
competitive career patterns, researchers endanger their prestige if they
&dquo;dirty their hands&dquo; in social reality and risk becoming mired in its
complexities. But the academic milieu deserves only part of the blame,
for it too is enmeshed in a complex exchange relationship with a whole
range of powerful social institutions. Social scientists produce knowl-
edge and provide professional services to a market of consumers consist-
ing of corporations and various levels of government. Historically, this
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relationship is fairly recent, beginning with the field of economics
during the Depression and expanding at an immense rate through all of
the social sciences since World War 11. And this relationship appears
to work as all economic arrangements are supposed to work: the con-
sumers buy what they need and leave the rest on the shelves.
But, as we see in the examples of rape and race relations, the big
consumers do not have an all-powerful hegemony over the definition of
social problems and the character of research. The research community
is far from merely a handmaiden for corporate and governmental
administrators. We noted a consistent concern with liberal reform
running through the literature in every area. If person-centered ques-
tions are asked too often, they are at least asked with a sense of concern
for those under study. If organizational psychologists accept the
legitimacy of management-control too readily, at least they use their
professional positions to argue for the humanization of working
conditions.
Our reading also showed a thin but consistent strain of deeper
criticism in all of the areas. It appears to take a social movement,
however-or at least the presence of a constituency group of social
problem &dquo;victims&dquo; within the research community-to push social
science toward its ideal. As an example, the National Organization of
Women’s Task Force on Rape led to a lobbying effort in Congress to
establish a National Center for the Prevention and Control of Rape in
the Rational Institute of Mental Health. This center, staffed pre-
dominately by women researchers, primarily funds studies of legal and
social factors relating to rape and demonstration projects for aiding
victims.
Predictions
Keeping this in mind, we can extrapolate from our 1936, 1956, and
i976 data to forecast the shape of social science twenty years from now.
On the whole, there is little reason to expect much change by 1996. Jour-
nals will still carry articles on the lQs of delinquents, the Rorschachs of
alcoholics, and the details of bizarre suicides. The internal criticisms and
calls for multidisciplinary cooperation that have echoed through the
literature for at least 40 years, will continue unabated and with the same
lack of impact. As one elder statesman of social psychology phrased it,
&dquo;The dogs may bark, but the caravan rolls on.&dquo; By and large, social
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science will remain wedded to the priorities of real-world organizations
that will be with us for some time.
In particular areas, however, change will occur. As racial inequalitv
fails to evaporate but Black and Chicano researchers are better repre-
sented in the social sciences, the system orientation of race relations
research will likely remain and perhaps increase in complexity. Every
area involving women-from marriage to motherhood to sex roles to
achievement-will certainly look different twenty years from now. With
women researchers rethinking issues defined primarily by men, these
differences may be dramatic. If the gay movement and gay communities
remain viable, our view of sexuality also may be considerably altered.
We could see a shift from personal characteristics to cultural stereotypes
as the origin of emotional disturbance among nonheterosexuals.
As the baby-boom cohort ages-inside as well as outside academia-
we could expect the current expansion of gerontology to continue and
perhaps turn from biology to economics, culture, and politics if urged by
such constituency groups as they Grey Panthers. And, finally, if labor
. unions were to take a serious interest in worker satisfaction and forge
links with the research community, we might see a shift in emphasis
from milieu to system-level variables in this area.
But the most disturbing result from our data-which confirms our
subjective impression-is the simplistic, fragmented, nontheoretical
nature of at least that part of the social science enterprise we examined.
Looking back over his own 50 years in psychology, as well as compar-
ing the 1927 volume of Psychological Abstracts with the 1974 volume.
McKinney observed:
One change has been the lessened attention to &dquo;grand&dquo; theory, which dealt
with the whole organism in the earlier years. As the discipline became
more specialized, miniature theory, associated with processes within the
organism, became more popular [McKinney, 1976: 840].
Koch (1978), forecasting psychology’s future, similarly noted that
when the details of the 100-vear history of psychology are consulted, the
patent tendency is toward theoretical and substantive fractionation (and
increasing insularity among the &dquo;specialities&dquo;), not integration [19;’8:
637].
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Here we must support the kind of criticisms lodged by Habermas
( 1973) and Gouldner (1970): Social science seems to have endorsed a
kind of rationality that fragments and isolates-a kind of rationality
appropriate to technical problem-solving but not to developing holistic
conceptions of social life that could become topics for public debate on
social policy issues. Just as Mills found social pathology texts to be mere
compiIations treating each problem as if it existed in its own world,
30 years later we find virtually no discussion of how these social prob-
lems might be related to one another. Even common sense does better
on this score, since all it takes is a drive through a large inner city to
recognize that drug abuse, delinquency, and a variety of other &dquo;prob-
lems&dquo; are responses to the same social conditions. It becomes clear that
in these environments there are system-level factors such as unemploy-
ment and discrimination that keep some whole groups in a problematic
relationship to the rest of society.
Social life cloes form a totality, and we must see it as a totality if we
are to choose social policies wisely. The problem with social science is
not simply that it breaks the whole into parts-all good science does
that. The problem is that it ignores the totality and thus breaks it down
in ways that cannot be reintegrated. If researchers set out looking for
differences in questionnaire or trait-scale data (which comprises most of
our sampie) on the customary set of demographic variables, they will
find themselves at a loss to integrate their findings into a coherent
picture of the whole. They must choose between contributing to
Nontheoretical Hypotheses or becoming the worst kind of armchair
anthropologists.
As Sartre has pointed out, trying to reach the whole by compiling
more and more facts is like trying to get to one by adding integers to the
right of .99. Here lies the most serious failure of social science qua
science: its preoccupation with breaking social phenomena down into
collections of facts that cannot be reintegrated into a model of society -
Except where politicized constituency groups push social science to




1. Our use of the Freudian unconscious here is merely by way of example. This end of
the continuum could be represented by "reinforcement history." "physiological sub-
stratum," or any other process deep in the person.
2. Napoli (1975) points out that clinical psychology was considered largely as
"women’s work" until it became psychotherapy, whereupon the percentage of women in
the field dropped sharply,
3. See Caplan and Nelson ( 1973).
4. Personal correspondence.
5. We excluded oniv dissertations, books, articles in foreign languages. those with
purely medical content. and those on race relations outside of the United States. Our rape
sample is small because there has been relativety little published on it in English. We had to
take all of the articles indexed between 1933 and 1939 and between 1955 and 1957 to create
the small sample we have. The substance abuse sample is larger than the others both
because this is the largest area in the indexes and because we needed to select enough of
both alcohol and drug-related studies to make more detailed comparisons between them
6 When the author explicitly treated race. sex, or age as indices of belonging to a
cultural group. we coded them as "culture" variables. When education or occupation was
explicitiy treated as defining positions in a soctal structure. we coded it as an "SES"
variable. Similarlv, when community was used as an indicator of a cultural area (such as
North versus South), we coded it as a "culture" variable. For each article. we coded up to
ten such independent variables. In many cases the variables we coded as "independent
variables" were not technically so, in that they were not studied in relation to a dependent
variable. Articles reporting. for example. the attitudes of a single group or the suicide rate
among a single group do not actually examine a relationship between two variables.
7. In our analyses, we used seven categories of attributional patterns which differ
from the seven categories of causal attributions. The attributional pattern variable
combines complex relationships (such as system milieu person problem) with multiple
simple relationships involving the same levels (i.e.. system problem. milieu problem and
person problems). For example, the attributional pattern -milieu person" includes
all articles involving milieu and person levels. but no system attributions. It thus includes
articles with a single milieu person problem attribution, and those with both person
problem and milieu person attributions. Similarly. the "system-person" category contains
articles with a single system person problem attribution and those with both person
problem and system problem attributions.
8. These data are based on a version of the attributional pattern var bl that groups
articles according to these four types.
9. One-way analysis of variance shows the area differences to be significant at the
p < .0001 level for all three variables.
10. These figures total over 100% because each article could receive up to three theory
codes. Most, however, only asserted relevance to a single theory.
11. The following abstract was actually quite typical of those years:
5170. Schuppe.--. Warum vermehrte Sittslichkeitsdelikte? (W hy have sex crimes
increased?) Krim. Monatsh., 1934. 8, 139-140. The author discusses only attacks
on children. While serious crimes have decreased about one-half under the Third
Reich, arrests for sexual crimes have almost doubled. Schuppe considers that the
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increase is more apparent than real. Under the Marxist regime, punishment of all
criminals was exceedingly lax. The revolution has had a very favorable moral
effect. The new law concerning habitual criminals not only punishes sex delin-
quents severely, but above all works prophylactically by making them harmless
through sterilization. The public knows this and also realizes more keenly the
necessity of protecting children. The campaign is only begun. As soon as steriliza-
tion can be carried out ruthlessly, sex crimes will decrease.-M. E. Morse (Balti-
more).
12. While there may not have been many Blacks in the prestigious universities in 1936,
there do appear to have been a sizable number in the Black universities who tied their
research to the attainment of equality. The Journal of Negro Education. The Black
Scholar. and the Journal of Black Srudies have provided a forum for the research of
Black intellectuals. The creation of new journals oriented to the research concerns of
constituency groups represents one way they make an impact on the field. Signs and
Feminist Studies provide a forum for feminist-oriented research, and The Journal of
Homosexuality and the Homosexuality Counseling Journal serve a similar function for
less traditional research on gays.
13. Alcoholism research did. however, gain considerable impetus in the 1930s from
the debate over temperance and prohibition. The largest organized group of alcoholics,
Alcoholics Anonymous, has consistently supported the medical-model disease concep-
tion as part of their concern with curing individuals. The popularity of other drugs&mdash;
notably marijuana&mdash;has led to constituency groups advocating its legalization. We have
not yet compared research on alcohol with that on drug abuse, and it is unclear what
impact this may have on marijuana research. It is unlikely, however, that anyone would
reap career gain today by writing the kind of "Reefer Madness" pieces we found in our
1936 sample&mdash;especially with colleagues who, so to speak, have been experienced.
14. In particular, see Haskell (1977) and Napoli (1975).
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